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Abstract
We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and
particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There
is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure pri-
vate good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and
in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for them-
selves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer
power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreas-
ing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the
theory.
Keywords: Legislative Bargaining, Public Goods, Eﬃciency.
JEL classification: C7, D72, C92, C52.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important questions in economics and political science is understanding how
any collective body makes decisions, and, in particular, under what conditions we can expect
an eﬃcient provision of public goods by such collective bodies. Public good provision is a key
aspect of what governments and legislatures do, with governments and legislatures typically
being the most important suppliers of public goods. Even in countries where the government
is not the most important supplier of goods like health care and education, it is often the
sole supplier of some key public goods such as defense and law enforcement. However,
collective decision making bodies are far from being “benevolent unitary actors.” Rather
their members are constantly trading oﬀ the virtues of the public goods under consideration
against the attractiveness of spending the money on particularistic goods (pork) benefiting
themselves individually or their districts.1 Theoretical and experimental methods can help
clarify this trade-oﬀ, with our goal in this paper being to identify and characterize the
behavioral patterns of a collective body facing these types of choices.
Most of the experimental literature on public good provision has focussed on voluntary
contribution mechanisms, or provision point mechanisms, in which individual agents decide
between allocating their personal endowment to their own private use or to benefit the group
as a whole. Both of these mechanisms have a very diﬀerent structure from the one legislators
face in bargaining over budget allocations, as public goods (both level and scope) have to be
determined by some collective-choice procedure, and there always are particularistic goods
available as alternative ways to use the budget. Thus, we need to turn to a reasonably
appropriate model that explicitly considers the political process by which public goods are
provided to capture the competing forces at work in political institutions.
For the most part, legislative bargaining theory has focused either on distributive poli-
tics2 or on policy decisions. Only recently have there been major eﬀorts to model legislators’
incentives to provide public goods when the alternative use of the budget is to provide partic-
1Particularistic goods here can be local public goods in the sense that they primarily yield benefits within
the district the legislator represents. In this sense public goods refer to more global public goods which are
enjoyed by all districts.
2The paper by Battaglini and Palfrey in this issue contains a dynamic model of distributive politics and
a rich experimental analysis thereof. Their results are not directly comparable with ours, not even in the
treatment where the theory that we test predicts only particularistic goods in equilibrium, since the two
models are very diﬀerent.
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ularistic goods.3 Volden and Wiseman (2005, henceforth VW) provide a benchmark model
for our experimental analysis, since they model a bargaining game where legislators can
agree on any division of the budget between particularistic and collective good spending.4
Previous experimental work on legislative bargaining has focused on purely distributive
settings. The motivation behind these experiments has been to investigate the ability of
the (stationary) subgame perfect equilibrium (henceforth SSPE) outcome to characterize
allocations compared to alternative models, to measure the bargaining power of the agenda
setter, and to determine whether or not Riker’s minimum-winning-coalition view of bar-
gaining is confirmed (see for instance McKelvey 1991; Fréchette, Kagel and Lehrer 2003
(henceforth FKL); Diermeier and Morton 2004; Diermeier and Gailmard 2006; Fréchette,
Kagel and Morelli, 2005a, b (henceforth FKM(2005a, b))).5
Adding the possibility of proposing diﬀerent combinations of private and public goods
introduces a number of interesting new behavioral questions: Given that the public good
provides benefits to everyone, will agents be biased (relative to the theory) in favor of public
good provision out of equity, eﬃciency or some other considerations? Can the possibility of
public goods increase proposer power in some situations? What happens to the proposed
combinations of private and public goods when the relative value legislators place on private
goods changes?
The VW model extends the Baron-Ferejohn (1989, henceforth BF) alternating-oﬀer
model of majoritarian bargaining to a legislature determining how to allocate a fixed bud-
get between public goods that benefit all legislators’ districts and particularistic goods that
benefit an individual district. In its closed-rule, infinite-horizon form, someone is picked at
random to make a proposal, then the others simultaneously vote yes or no on it. If the
3There is a line of research incorporating collective and particularistic elements (e. g., Austen-Smith and
Banks 1988, Crombez 1996, Banks and Duggan 2000, Baron and Diermeier 2001, Jackson and Moselle 2002,
Morelli 1999, Goertz 2006), but those models do not capture the explicit trade-oﬀs resulting from the fact
that private and public good spending are alternative uses of the same fixed budget.
4Lizzeri and Persico (2001) capture some of the trade-oﬀs between public and private goods in party
platforms. Leblanc, Snyder and Tripathi (2000) and Battaglini and Coate (2006) also contain interesting
predictions about legislative bargaining when deciding on multiple policy issues. We focus on the VW
model because it explicitly deals with the comparative statics we are interested in, namely the changes in
bargaining behavior as legislators’ utility from pork relative to common interest policies varies.
5There are many more recent, closely related, experimental investigations of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
type models: Kagel, Sung, and Winter 2010; Diermeier and Gailmard 2006; Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey
2010; Drouvelis, Montero, and Sefton 2007.
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majority rejects the proposal then a new proposer is chosen at random, with the process
repeating until an allocation is determined (with discounting on the size of the budget).6
Legislators utility functions attach value to the public and private goods, with weights being
the same across all legislators. This utility function and the weight associated with the value
of public versus particularistic goods can be thought of as a reduced form expression incor-
porating the impact of the electoral system; e.g., in systems where a politician’s survival
is determined more by what happens locally, then the weight put on public goods will be
smaller than when their survival depends more on what happens nationally.
In our experiment we vary these weights across treatment conditions in order to produce
(1) a situation in which there is a unique equilibrium in which only public goods are provided
(a dominant strategy for all players), (2) a “mixed region” in which both public and private
goods are provided and (3) a region with only private goods provided within a minimum
winning coalition (henceforth MWC). The model predicts that in the mixed region the
proposer takes some private goods for herself, allocating the remainder of the budget to
public goods. Further, using the standard subgame perfect equilibrium logic, as the relative
value of private goods increases, the proposer oﬀers more public goods in order to keep
responders on their “participation constraint.”
Our main experimental results can be summarized as follows: Within the pure public
good region, the vast majority of oﬀers are all public goods. In the pure private good region,
the predominant tendency is for MWCs with no public goods. In the mixed region we observe
a multiplicity of allocations which, over time, slowly converges toward “equilibrium type
allocations” with private goods allocated exclusively to the proposer, and the remainder
of the budget devoted exclusively to the public good. The level of the public good is
substantially higher than predicted under the SSPE allocation, as proposers are unable to
get a favorable vote for anything approaching the SSPE. That is, there is far less proposer
power within the mixed region than predicted, consistent with the limited proposer power
found in past legislative bargaining models with only particularistic goods (e.g., Diermeier
and Morton, 2004; FKM, 2005a, b), as well as the results reported here for the all private
goods region. Unlike past experiments where the absence of high levels of proposer power
had no impact (at least directionally) on the comparative static predictions of the model, in
6The discounting is designed to capture delay costs, including the fact that legislators may not be reelected
to enjoy the fruits of their labor.
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this case it does: the share of the budget allocated to the public good decreases within the
mixed region as the value of the public good decreases, contrary to the model’s prediction
that more public goods need to be provided in the mixed region to keep potential coalition
partners on their participation constraint.
Our experiment has implications for the public goods literature as it analyzes an en-
tirely diﬀerent framework for public good provision compared to voluntary contribution and
provision point mechanisms that are typically investigated. Our results are similar in some
dimensions to VCM and provision point experiments (e. g., the level of public good pro-
vision is higher than predicted throughout most of the mixed region). However, there are
some major diﬀerences: Given the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of a contribution
to the public good within the mixed region, public goods provision is substantially higher
than reported in VCM games and does not decrease over time as typically reported in VCM
games. These diﬀerences reflect diﬀerences in equilibrium outcomes between the legislative
bargaining game and VCM games, as well as the constraints placed on proposer power typ-
ically reported in legislative bargaining games. The experiment also has implications for
the “other regarding preference literature” that has grown up around bilateral bargaining
games in the economics literature (i.e., concern for others’ income that goes beyond the
usual assumption that only own income matters). These implications are discussed in the
concluding section of the paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the Volden-Wiseman (2005) model
that serves as our benchmark. Sections 3 and 4 give the experimental design and the results,
respectively. Summary and concluding remarks are reported in Section 5.
2 Benchmark Model and Related Hypotheses
In this section we describe the VW (2005) model.
Consider a legislature of N politicians, representing diﬀerent legislative districts, who
have to make a collective decision on how to allocate a fixed budget between a public good
and private goods (pork barrel projects). Let N be an odd number. Denoting by y the share
of the budget allocated to the public good and by x the N -dimensional vector of private
good shares allocated to the N legislators (y +
PN
i=1 xi ≤ 1), the utility function of each
6
legislator is given by7
Ui(x, y) = αxi + (1− α)yq
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the relative weight of private goods in the utility function8 and q repre-
sents the absolute value (or return) of spending a dollar in public good production.9 Each
legislator has the same probability of being selected by Nature as the proposer of a division
of the (unitary) budget. If at least (N − 1)/2 responders accept the proposal the budget
is divided according to the proposal. If the majority rejects, another random proposer is
selected, and the budget shrinks using the discount factor δ. The status quo is no budget
allocation. The bargaining game is a straightforward extension of the (closed rule) infinite
horizon bargaining game of BF (1989) to a budget division involving two dimensions - public
and particularistic goods. The solution concept is stationary subgame perfection (SSPE).
The model predicts that, fixing q, for low values of α only public goods will be supplied
as it is a dominant strategy to do so. At the other extreme, for high values of α only
private goods will be supplied, in which case only members of a minimum winning coalition
(MWC) receive positive shares. For intermediate values of α the public good is supplied
and the proposer takes some private benefits for himself, but does not oﬀer private benefits





The upper bound on the mixed region is given by
αMP =
q(N + 1)
2 + q(N + 1)
.
If α < q/(1 + q) it is a dominant strategy to oﬀer only public goods as particularistic
have a lower marginal utility than the public good. If α ∈ [αCM , αMP ), a proposer has no
7The expression here corresponds to the corrected expression provided by VW in their errata corrige for
their utility function. See http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/awiseman/VW_APSR_final.pdf.
8VW (2006) develop a slightly diﬀerent model where α is not constrained to take on values between
0 and 1, and legislators’ utilities are defined as αxi + qy. This specification does not qualitatively eﬀect
the equilibria, nor does it aﬀect the comparative statics predictions that we experimentally examine in this
paper. We prefer to investigate the model in its (2005) formulation because we want to vary the “relative”
value of private and public goods (by varying α across treatments) without scaling total utility up or down.
9The weight placed on private goods, α, can vary across legislators, which introduces a number of
interesting possibilities that lie beyond the scope of the present paper. See Christiansen (2010) for an
experiment exploring some of these implications.
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Figure 1: Public Good Contribution
incentive to deviate and oﬀer all public goods even though such a proposal would surely be
approved. The proposer prefers the mixed outcome to the all public goods outcome since he
is better oﬀ taking a share of the budget for himself while still getting his proposal passed.
In the mixed region, as α increases, the proposer decreases the share of the budget he
takes for himself in terms of private benefits. In other words, the theory predicts a non
monotonic relationship between the supply of the public good and the value legislators
place on private goods (α) as can be seen in Figure 1. Thus, starting with low values for
the private good (low values of α) the budget share going to private goods is zero. Once
α reaches αCM the budget share for private goods jumps up (with all of it going to the
proposer), only to decrease within the mixed region up to the point where the value of α
becomes so high that only private goods are oﬀered within a MWC (at which point the
share going to the proposer remains constant for further increases in α). In addition, under
the SSPE all stage one proposals pass, so that bargaining ends with the first proposal.
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3 Experimental Design
Each experimental session used a legislature/committee comprised of N = 5 subjects, with
the value of the public good q = 0.7 and the discount factor δ = 0.8 constant for all
treatments. Thus the range for the mixed region is given by [αCM , αMP ) = [0.412, 0.677).
The diﬀerent values of α used in experimental treatments were 0.3, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65 and
0.75. N and δ were selected to correspond to values used in previous experimental studies
of the BF game. Given those parameters, q was selected to provide a reasonably wide mixed
region.
Subjects were told that they had to decide how to divide 50 “francs” between “... two
types of allocations: (i) allocations to individual voters or (ii) allocations to the group of
voters as a whole (called the group allocation).” They were told the payoﬀ in francs allocated
to the group as a whole as well as the payoﬀ in dollars and that those were a function of
“...francs allocated to you as an individual as well as your share of the group allocation.”
Everything was computerized with subjects screens automatically calculating the conversion
rate from the group allocation to individual payoﬀs, as well as the dollar payoﬀs for any
proposed allocation.10
Table 1 gives the equilibrium predictions for each value of α. The share of the budget
devoted to the public good is reported as well as the share going to the proposer, along with
payoﬀs (listed in dollars). Note that except for the case of pure private goods (α = 0.75),
shares to responders represent only payoﬀs from the public good. In the pure private goods
case, shares are allocated only to members of the minimum winning coalition (MWC).
Table 1 also shows the eﬃciency levels predicted under the SSPE. In all cases eﬃciency
is maximized when y = 1 as this provides maximum total money payoﬀs. Eﬃciency is
measured as the ratio of the diﬀerence in the sum of the utilities (monetary payoﬀs) in
equilibrium and the sum of the utilities when y = 1.
Between 10 and 20 subjects were recruited for each experimental session, so that there
would be a minimum of 2, and a maximum of 4, groups of 5 subjects bargaining simul-
taneously in each session.11 After each bargaining round (when all groups had reached
10http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/print/fkm_pg_online_appendix.pdf provides sample instructions
and screen shots.
11Our intention was to have a minimum of 15 subjects in each session, but in some cases enough extras
showed up to be able to run four bargaining groups. Two sessions fell short of the desired 15 subjects and
were conducted with 10 subjects each (see Table 2 below). There are no discernible diﬀerences between
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α Budget Share Payoﬀs Eﬃciency
Public Good Private Allocation Proposer Responders
0.3 1 0 $24.50 $24.50a 1.000
0.45 0.483 0.517 $20.93 $9.30a 0.604
0.55 0.583 0.417 $20.65 $9.18a 0.728
0.65 0.680 0.320 $18.74 $8.33a 0.850
0.75 0 0.68 $25.50 $6.00b 0.857
α = weight placed on private goods in members utility function.
a Given to all responders.
b Given to coalition partners within a minimum winning coalition.
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions
agreement on an allocation), subjects were randomly re-matched. Subject numbers also
changed randomly between bargaining rounds (but not between the stages within a given
bargaining round).
Procedures for each bargaining round were as follows: First all subjects entered a pro-
posal on how to allocate the 50 francs. Then one proposal was picked randomly to be the
standing proposal. This proposal was posted on subjects’ screens giving the amounts in
francs allocated to each subject along with the dollar shares implied by the given allocation
as determined by the utility function Ui(x, y) along with the value of α in eﬀect for that
treatment.12 Proposals were voted up or down, with no opportunity for amendment. If a
simple majority accepted the proposal the payoﬀ was implemented and the bargaining round
ended. If the proposal was rejected, the process repeated itself (hence initiating a new stage
of the same bargaining round). Complete voting results were posted on subjects’ screens,
giving the dollar amount allocated by subject number along with the francs allocated to
the public good, whether that subject voted for or against the proposal, and whether the
proposal passed or not.13
sessions as a consequence of the number of subjects present.
12For example, in the α = 0.55 treatment, if a proposal allocated 40 francs to the public good, and the
remaining 10 francs to the proposer, subjects would see the implied dollar allocations ($12.60 for responders,
$18.10 for the proposer) on their screens for all players along with the allocations in francs.
13 Screens also displayed the proposed shares and votes for the last three bargaining rounds as well as the
proposed shares and votes for up to the past three stages of the current bargaining round. Other general
information such as the number of votes required for a proposal to be accepted were also displayed.
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Treatments Number of Number of Rounds for Final Payment in $ (per subject)
(value of α) Session Subjects Rounds Payment Min Max Average
0.3 1 10 12 1 27.60 30.40 29.30
2 15 12 1 32.50 32.50 32.50
3 15 12 1 31.10 32.50 32.09
0.45 4 15 12 1 25.40 27.60 26.61
5 20 12 1 21.50 27.30 25.00
0.55 6 20 12 1 19.10 26.10 21.48
7 25 12 1 20.70 25.00 23.03
0.65 8 20 12 1 8.00 22.70 15.61
9 15 12 1 15.40 25.60 18.20
10 20 12 1 8.00 28.40 15.60
0.75 11 15 12 1 8.90 20.20 15.73
12 20 12 1 8.40 22.30 15.56
13 15 12 1 8.00 26.80 15.18
0.45 to 0.55 14 10 20a 2 39.30 45.40 42
0.55 to 0.45 15 15 20a 2 37.40 44.20 40.81
a See text.
Table 2: Experimental Sessions
11
A total of 15 sessions, all with inexperienced subjects, were conducted. Table 2 lists the
values of α along with the number of subjects in each session. Sessions 1-13 all employed 12
bargaining rounds, with one of the rounds, selected at random, to be paid oﬀ on.14 Sessions
14 and 15 employed a cross-over design with an initial set of 12 bargaining rounds with values
of α equal to 0.45 and 0.55, respectively. These were followed by another 8 bargaining rounds
in which the value of α was changed from 0.45 to 0.55 in session 14 and from 0.55 to 0.45 in
session 15.15 These cross-over sessions were conducted as the between session results with
α = 0.45 and .55 failed to show the predicted increase in the budget share allocated to the
public good. This design was employed to enable us to use own subject control to test this
sensitive comparative static prediction of the model, and to provide subjects with the most
striking contrast in terms of their own payoﬀs for the predicted increase (decrease) in public
good allocation following the increase (decrease) in α that the theory predicts. In both of
these sessions, subjects were paid on the basis of one random draw from each of the two sets
of bargaining rounds. However, these draws were only made after both sets of bargaining
rounds had been completed, while the planned change in the value of α, along with the
extra 8 bargaining rounds, was only announced at the end of the first set of 12 bargaining
rounds.16
Subjects were recruited through e-mail solicitations from students enrolled in economics
classes at Ohio State University. This resulted in recruiting a broad cross-section of un-
dergraduate students. All subjects received a participation fee of $8 along with whatever
monetary allocation they obtained from the randomly selected bargaining round(s). Ses-
sions lasted between an hour and fifteen minutes to an hour and forty five minutes. Table
2 gives the minimum, maximum, and average earnings including the show-up fee for each
session.
This design generates four central questions for investigation: (1) Do negotiations stop
immediately as predicted? (2) Are proposals within each region “equilibrium type” propos-
14These cash bargaining rounds were preceded by a bargaining round in which subjects were “walked
through” the various contingencies resulting from, for example, accepting or rejecting oﬀers.
15These crossovers were announced after completion of the initial set of bargaining rounds, and were
completed well within the time frame for which subjects were recruited. Upon completion of the entire
session, a single round was randomly selected for payment from the first set of bargaining rounds as well as
from the second set.
16That is, instructions for the first 12 bargaining rounds were in all respects the same as the instructions
for the corresponding sessions without the change in the value of α.
12
als? (3) Do proposers exploit their power as predicted? (4) Do we observe the predicted
relation between α and y across regions as well as within the mixed region?
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. First, the performance of the SSPE
predictions of the model will be evaluated in terms of the four questions noted above. These
results will be organized by first presenting evidence dealing with a question, followed by a
summary of the evidence in the form of a “Conclusion.” Second, the main deviations from
the theory identified in the mixed public and private good region will be explored. Finally,
we discuss the present results in relationship to results from other legislative bargaining ex-
periments as well as their implications for the public goods literature and the other regarding
preference literature.
4 Results
4.1 Overview of Experimental Results
Most bargaining rounds had only 1 stage (ended with the first proposal voted on), as the
theory predicts. More specifically, 86% of bargaining rounds ended in stage 1, 13% in stage
2, and 1% in stages greater than 2 (with 5 being the maximum number of stages in any
bargaining round). These numbers are essentially unaﬀected when looking at rounds 10
and above when subjects would have had more experience with the game.17 There were
minimal diﬀerences in time to agreement across treatments, with treatments which had large
numbers of public good oﬀers taking slightly fewer stages (on average) to reach agreement
(reflective of the fact that all public good allocations were always accepted).18
Conclusion 1 The vast majority of bargaining rounds ends in stage 1 as the theory predicts,
with only 1% of all bargaining rounds extending beyond stage 2.
17Given that most of the data is in stage 1, the data analysis that follows uses stage 1 data only, unless
noted otherwise. This is done for convenience, as it makes comparisons simpler since we do not have to
worry about the eﬀect of discounting on payoﬀs.
18For α = 0.3, the average number of rounds to agreement was 1.05 versus 1.27 for α = 0.65, with the
other averages between these two values. A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null of equality across all α, but
one cannot reject the null that α = 0.3 and 0.45 are the same, while α = 0.55, 0.65, and 0.75 are the same.
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The number of subjects who were oﬀered strictly positive amounts of private goods is
reported in Table 3.19 Looking at all rounds, the modal oﬀer consists of equilibrium type
allocations with α = 0.30, 0.55 and 0.75 (no private allocations with α = 0.30, all private
goods split between a MWC with α = 0.75, and only 1 player, the proposer, receiving
private goods with α = 0.55). The two notable exceptions are α = 0.45 and 0.65, at either
end of the mixed region, where equilibrium type allocations also consist of 1 player, the
proposer, receiving private goods. In contrast to this prediction, there are too many all
public proposals with α = 0.45 and too many MWC type oﬀers with α = 0.65. Equilibrium
type oﬀers are more frequent for all treatments in rounds 10 and above, indicative of a clear,
consistent learning process favoring equilibrium type allocations for all treatments except for
α = 0.30 (which remained quite steady throughout). These learning patterns are reported
in detail in Section 4.2 below.20 These changes are suﬃciently strong that for rounds 10
and above the modal oﬀer is an equilibrium type oﬀer for α = 0.65, and equilibrium type
oﬀers have increased from 32% to 40% for α = 0.45.
The α = 0.3 condition reveals some ineﬃciencies as 20% of all proposals involve some
private goods. However, these misallocations are relatively small in magnitude, as the
average share of the budget allocated to the public good was 92.9% calculated over all
rounds, and 96.1% for rounds 10 and above (see Table 4). Finally, in round 12, these
allocations of particularistic goods represent just 2% of the budget.
Conclusion 2 Looking at all rounds, the modal oﬀer yields private benefits to as many
subjects as the theory predicts with the exception of α = 0.45 and α = 0.65, with too many
all public good oﬀers in the first case and too many players receiving private goods in the
second case. There is learning/adjustment going on within sessions in that equilibrium type
oﬀers are more common in later bargaining rounds for all values of α.
Table 4 gives the average proposed share of the budget allocated to the public good by
treatment for all proposals and for equilibrium type proposals.21 It also shows the share
19The appendix contains a table equivalent to Table 3 except that it only includes accepted oﬀers. The
relative frequencies are very similar to those shown in Table 3.
20For the cross-over sessions we include data for all 8 bargaining rounds after the change in α when
characterizing experienced play (periods 10 and above). We do so on the grounds that subjects are already
quite familiar with the structure of the game. Results for experienced play are robust to limiting the data
to the last 3 bargaining periods before and after the crossover.
21Average accepted shares are quite similar to proposed shares, see Table 10 in the appendix.
14
Number of Subjects Oﬀered Private Allocations
0 1 2 3 4 5
α = 0.3 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.10
α = 0.45 0.54 0.32 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.07
α = 0.55 0.28 0.43 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.11
α = 0.65 0.09 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.03 0.17
α = 0.75 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.62 0.05 0.25
Rounds 10 and Above
α = 0.3 0.82 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.08
α = 0.45 0.53 0.40 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04
α = 0.55 0.28 0.57 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.04
α = 0.65 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.12
α = 0.75 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.73 0.02 0.15
Equilibrium Type Oﬀers are in Bold.
Table 3: Frequencies With Which Diﬀerent Numbers of Subjects Were Allocated Private
Benefits: All Oﬀers (including those not voted on).
All Proposals Equilibrium Type Proposals
All Rounds Rounds > 9 All Rounds Rounds > 9 SSPE
α = 0.3 0.929 0.961 1.000 1.000 1.000
α = 0.45 0.905 0.934 0.860 0.871 0.483
α = 0.55 0.802 0.858 0.843 0.847 0.583
α = 0.65 0.450 0.569 0.777 0.762 0.680
α = 0.75 0.148 0.114 0.049 0.026 0.000
Table 4: Average Proposed Provision of Public Good
15
predicted under the SSPE. Public good allocations are only slightly smaller, on average,
when going from α = 0.3 to α = 0.45. However, the distributions are statistically diﬀerent
between these two treatments (rank sum test, p-value < 0.1 for all rounds and < 0.05 for
rounds 10 and above).22 All of the other pairwise comparisons of the distribution of public
good allocations between treatments are statistically significant at the 1% level or better.
In particular, there is a statistically significant decrease in the budget share devoted to
public goods going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55 and then to α = 0.65, contrary to what
the theory predicts.23 This diﬀerence, although relatively small going from α = 0.45 to
α = 0.55 is quite robust. For example suppose that we drop all the subjects who always
propose only public goods with α = 0.45 on the grounds that they are simply miscalibrated,
which biases the average allocation against what the theory predicts.24 Then looking at
the cross-over sessions, using own subject diﬀerences as the unit of observation, the average
share of the budget allocated to the public good for all proposals for all rounds is 0.88 with
α = 0.45 versus 0.78 with α = 0.55, and 0.89 versus 0.83 in rounds 10 and above, with both
these diﬀerences statistically significant at the 5% level. Going from α = 0.55 to α = 0.65,
the decrease in the budget share going to public goods is quite dramatic, in large measure
because of the large number of proposals allocating private goods to three players instead of
one. Finally, note the small share allocated to the public good with α = 0.75, close in size to
the misallocation (but in the opposite direction) as in the all public good region (α = 0.3).
Within the mixed region, even conditioning on equilibrium type proposals, the average
proposed share of the budget allocated to the public good decreases throughout. Although
this contradicts one of the key comparative static predictions of the model, this reflects the
absence of proposer power at anywhere near the levels predicted under the SSPE, consistent
with the rather limited proposer power reported in earlier legislative bargaining experiments
with all particularistic goods. This in turn is related to the fact that proposers are sensitive
22Throughout the paper descriptive statistics use all the relevant data, with statistical tests averaging all
the observations for a given subject first, using subject averages as the unit of observation (except when
regressions are estimated).
23This is established two ways. One way is using the ranksum test for all rounds except those after round
twelve. The other is using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test using data from the cross-over
sessions. In both cases we can reject a null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in favor of a smaller allocation with
α = 0.55 at the 0.01 level or better.
24This accounts for 9 out of 25 subjects for all rounds and 11 out of 25 subjects for rounds 10 or higher
in the cross-over sessions.
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Budget Share Payoﬀs
α Public Private to Proposer Responders∗
Good Proposer
SSPE 1 0 $24.50 $24.50
0.3 Average All 0.973 0.009 $23.96 $23.90
Avg. Eq. Type 1 0 $24.50 $24.50
SSPE 0.483 0.517 $20.93 $9.30
0.45 Average All 0.929 0.049 $18.99 $18.01
Avg. Eq. Type 0.884 0.111 $19.51 $17.04
SSPE 0.583 0.417 $20.65 $9.18
0.55 Average All 0.886 0.080 $16.15 $14.19
Avg. Eq. Type 0.868 0.127 $17.17 $13.70
SSPE 0.680 0.320 $18.74 $8.33
0.65 Average All 0.548 0.223 $13.95 $8.58
Avg. Eq. Type 0.798 0.187 $15.86 $9.90
SSPE 0 0.68 $25.50 $3.00
0.75 Average All 0.179 0.319 $13.53 $6.27
Avg. Eq. Type 0.045 0.396 $15.25 $5.63
SSPE = predicted under the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium.
Average All = averages for all accepted oﬀers.
Avg. Eq. Type = averages for equilibrium type oﬀers.
∗ Average over all 4 responders even when less than 4 subjects are
allocated strictly positive amounts.
Table 5: Theoretical Predictions and Observed Averages for Accepted Oﬀers
to the level of earnings inequality that potential coalition partners are willing to vote for
(see Section 4.2 below).
Conclusion 3 Public good provision decreases monotonically throughout as the value of
private goods (α)increases, contrary to the model’s prediction that within the mixed region
public good provision increases as α increases. This is true whether we consider all proposals
or condition on equilibrium type proposals.
Table 5 gives the SSPE prediction in terms of public versus particularistic good alloca-
tions, as well as the payoﬀs to the proposer and responder. It also reports the average for
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all accepted oﬀers, and the average conditional on the accepted oﬀer being an equilibrium
type allocation.25 Note that in the case of α = 0.75, since the equilibrium calls for a MWC,
responders payoﬀs must be multiplied by 2 to know how much coalition partners within the
MWC are being oﬀered.
Focusing on proposer power, the average payoﬀ diﬀerence between proposers and re-
sponders is $0.06, $0.98, $1.96, $5.37, and $7.26 for the α equal to 0.3, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, and
0.75 treatments respectively. Conditioning on the oﬀer being an equilibrium type oﬀer, the
diﬀerences are $2.47, $3.47, and $5.96 for α equal to 0.45, 0.55 and 0.65, and $3.99 within
the MWC for α = 0.75. Other than for all proposals with α = 0.3, the higher payoﬀs of pro-
posers are all statistically significant (p < 0.01 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test),
with proposer power increasing as α increases. However, the higher payoﬀs represent only a
fraction of what proposers are predicted to take for themselves: 21%, 30%, 33%, and 31%
of what they are predicted to make with α equal to 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, and 0.75, respectively
(percentages are for the equilibrium type oﬀers).
Conclusion 4 Proposers exploit their power by taking greater shares than responders in
every treatment where they are predicted to do so. However, the level of proposer power is
significantly less than predicted under the SSPE in all treatments.
To summarize, the theory performs well on many dimensions. First, subjects almost
always agree on a division in round 1 as predicted. Second, there is some proposer power in
both the mixed region and in the all private goods region, and this increases as α increases.
Third, the share of the budget allocated to public goods decreases going from α = 0.3 to
α = 0.45 and from α = 0.65 to α = 0.75. There are however four main deviations from the
theory. First, the extent to which proposer power is exercised is far from what is predicted
in the SSPE. Second, in the α = 0.45 treatment the modal oﬀer is an all public goods oﬀer.
Third, in the α = 0.65 treatment the modal oﬀer in the last three rounds consists of an
equilibrium type oﬀer, but this is not the case when all rounds are considered. Fourth, the
25Up to this point, tables used all the data with the equivalent table restricting attention to accepted
oﬀers in the Appendix. The advantage of using all oﬀers is mainly increased sample size (as well as the
fact that conclusions are not materially aﬀected using only accepted oﬀers). The reason for the change of
focus here to only accepted oﬀers is that proposer power (which is what this table is used to study) is only
relevant to the extent that it can be exercised. If proposers ask for a lot, but their oﬀers are rejected, then
they do not have proposer power.
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fraction of resources allocated to public goods decreases as α increases within the mixed
region.
In the next section we focus on these diﬀerences from equilibrium predictions within
the mixed region. Of particular interest is the fact that the fraction of resources allocated
to public goods decreases as α increases as this contradicts one of the key comparative
static predictions of the model. Experience with experimental outcomes has taught us,
and most of the profession, that the main gravitational forces inherent in any given model
will often be at play even though the point predictions of the model are not satisfied.
However, breakdowns in comparative static predictions are rarer, and are suggestive of
more fundamental deficiencies, so that we take them much more seriously.
4.2 Deviations from Equilibrium Predictions in the Mixed Region
This section elaborates on the main factors we believe underlie the paucity of equilibrium
type proposals with α = 0.45 and 0.65, as well as the failure of public good allocations to
increase within the mixed region. First, for all values of α within the mixed region players’
first impulse is not to provide equilibrium type allocations. This is shown in Table 6 which
reports proposals in the first bargaining round of each treatment: These average 12% of
all proposals in the mixed region, which is substantially less than the round one frequency
of equilibrium type proposals for α = 0.30 or 0.75. Further, as shown in Figure 2, there
are steady increases in the frequency of equilibrium type allocations for all values of α
within the mixed region, which, arguably, at least for α = 0.55 or 0.65, would ultimately
result in frequencies of equilibrium type allocations like those reported for α = 0.30 and
0.75 as subjects gained more experience. In this context, one reason why the frequency of
equilibrium type allocations in rounds 10 and above within the mixed region are less than
those found with α = 0.30 or 0.75 is that they have far more ground to make up compared
to these other treatments.
In addition to initial tendencies, voting patterns of responders place significant con-
straints on what kinds of proposals will be passed. In particular voting behavior limits
the amount of proposer power that can be exercised. Table 7 shows this, where votes are
regressed on own payoﬀs as well as payoﬀs to the proposer (votes of proposers are excluded






Number of Subjects Oﬀered Private Allocations
0 1 2 3 4 5
α = 0.3 0.68 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.18
α = 0.45 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.18
α = 0.55 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.28
α = 0.65 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.51 0.04 0.31
α = 0.75 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.38 0.08 0.46










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
Alpha = 0.3 Alpha = 0.45
Alpha = 0.55 Alpha = 0.65
Alpha = 0.75
Figure 2: Fraction of Equilibrium Type Oﬀers
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α = 0.3 α = 0.45 α = 0.55 α = 0.65 α = 0.75
Own Payoﬀ 16.03*** 43.41*** 27.95*** 22.43*** 20.99***
(5.57) (6.81) (2.56) (2.02) (1.89)
Payoﬀ to the Proposer -6.28 -20.16*** -7.75*** -6.49*** -0.54
(5.68) (4.46) (1.60) (1.57) (0.97)
Constant -2.71*** -5.05 -3.81*** -1.54*** -2.55***
(0.60) (1.47) (0.51) (0.54) (0.41)
ρ 0.26§§§ 0.69§§§ 0.36§§§ 0.27§§§ 0.04
(0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 380 528 640 528 480
Number of subjects 40 60 70 55 50
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
§ significant at 10%; §§ significant at 5%; §§§ significant at 1%
using a likelihood ratio test
Table 7: Random Eﬀects probit Estimates of the Determinants of Vote
is the variance of the subject specific random eﬀects.26 Own payoﬀ is significant in every
treatment. However, for the mixed region the proposer’s payoﬀ has a negative impact on the
likelihood that a proposal will be accepted. This limits the ability of proposers to exploit
their power. This is especially true for the α = 0.45 and 0.55 treatments.
These voting patterns impact the growth of, as well as the nature of, equilibrium-type
allocations that will pass in the mixed region. In particular, they go a long way to account
for the fact that for α = 0.45, all public good allocations grow faster than equilibrium
type allocations (from 0.11 in round 1 to 0.53 in rounds 10 and above versus 0.11 to 0.40 for
equilibrium type allocations). With α = 0.45 the average payoﬀ to proposers for equilibrium
type allocations that pass averaged $0.26 more than for an all public good allocation ($19.51
versus $19.25). This small increase in proposers’ payoﬀs carries with it considerably greater
risk of rejection, as 14% of equilibrium type allocations are rejected for α = 0.45 as opposed
26As such ρmeasures the extent of the individual subject eﬀects. ρ has a minimum value of 0 (no individual
subject eﬀects) and a maximum value of 1 (all the variance in the error is explained by individual subject
eﬀects).
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to no rejections of an all public good allocation. Thus, for α = 0.45, there is little to
be gained from an equilibrium type allocation, with its attendant risk of rejection and
budget shrinkage, compared to an all public good allocation. In contrast, with α = 0.55
proposers earned $1.42 more than an all public good allocation, a stronger incentive to
provide equilibrium type proposals than with α = 0.45, with essentially no diﬀerence in the
likelihood of these proposals being rejected (a 13% rejection rate with α = 0.55, with the
all public good allocation continuing to be passed 100% of the time.)
For α = 0.65 the main rival to an equilibrium type allocation is one in which there is a
MWC with all private goods, albeit one with a reasonably large share of the budget allo-
cated to public goods as well (averaging 24% of the budget in round one for these proposals).
It takes proposers some time to figure out that they can get more from equilibrium type
allocations than MWC type allocations, while also having a better chance of their propos-
als being accepted: $15.86 versus $13.86, with 85% of equilibrium type allocations passed
compared to 75% of MWC allocations.27
The evolution of equilibrium type proposals over time suggests that they would dominate
for α = 0.55 and 0.65, but not for α = 0.45. However, only looking at equilibrium type
allocations, the share of the budget going to public goods decreased within the mixed region,
contrary to the model’s prediction. This can largely be accounted for by voting patterns,
with proposers best responding to how potential coalition partners were voting. This is
shown under two scenarios in Table 8. Column 1 shows the value of α, with column 2
reporting the budget share devoted to the public good that would leave the median voter
indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting a proposal. The share that would leave the median
voter indiﬀerent is obtained from the voting regressions: Assuming an equilibrium type oﬀer
(which determines the exact relation between “Own Payoﬀ” and “Payoﬀ to the Proposer”)
what value for “Own Payoﬀ” yields an acceptance probability of 50%. Column 3 indicates
the budget share that would have maximized the proposers expected payoﬀ. To compute the
oﬀer that maximizes the proposers expected payoﬀ we use (Payoﬀ if accepted×Probability
of acceptance+0.8×Average Payoﬀ) where the second term approximates the continuation
value of the game and probability of acceptance is obtained from the voting regressions.28
27Average payoﬀs to proposers for proposals that passed are biased downward compared to payoﬀs for
proposals that were voted on - but not by much. The latter averaged $19.61, $17.34, and $16.47 for
α = 0.45, 0.55 and 0.65 respectively compared to $19.51, $17.17 and $15.86 for proposals that passed.
28 “Payoﬀ if accepted” corresponds to “Payoﬀ to the Proposer” in the voting regression. “Average Payoﬀ”
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α Median Voter Max EV Actual∗ Predicted
Indiﬀerent Proposer
0.45 78.8% 88.9% 87.1% 48.3%
0.55 75.8% 83.8% 84.7% 58.3%
0.65 70.7% 67.7% 76.2% 68.0%
∗ Equilibrium type proposals only; rounds> 9.
Table 8: Budget Share Allocated to Public Good
Column 4 shows the average budget share actually going to the public good for equilibrium
type allocations for periods 10 and above, with column 5 the budget share under the SSPE.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Table 8 is the diﬀerence in public good levels between
the SSPE and either the median voter or value maximizing allocations for α = 0.45 and 0.55,
with actual public good levels substantially higher than predicted. This reflects the fact that
the SSPE prediction calls for substantially more income inequality between proposers and
responders than is achievable under either scenario: - income diﬀerences of over $11 in both
cases, with proposers earning more than twice as much as those they would be counting on
to vote in favor of such proposals. This is a level of income inequality that would stand little,
if any, chance of passing (p < 0.01 for α = 0.45 and p < 0.05 for α = 0.55 ), and which
virtually never surfaced in the proposed allocations. Alternatively, consider the extreme
scenario of simply keeping public good provision at the same level (70.7%) required to keep
the median voter indiﬀerent with α = .65, for lower values of α: The voting regressions
indicate that such a proposal would have had a 39.3% chance of passing with α = .55,
with an expected payoﬀ to the proposer if passed of $7.50. In case of rejection, with the
game continuing and δ = .8, a reasonable upper bound for what the proposer might expect
after rejection is $12.60, compared to settling for an all public good allocation in the first
place of $15.75, with all public good allocations always passing.29 Thus, given how players
were voting, proposers would have had to be reasonably strong risk takers, for public good
shares remaining constant (no less decreasing) in going from α = .65 to α = .55. And they
would have had to be even more risk loving to keep public good shares constant in moving
is simply the unconditional average final payoﬀ.
29The $12.60 comes from an all public good allocation which is greater than the expected value of the
SSPE allocation, the average actual allocation, or the average equilibrium type allocation. With all payoﬀs
multiplied δ.
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to α = .45. As such there was hardly any room for public good shares to increase as α
increased within the mixed region, reflective of the low levels of proposer power identified in
earlier BF voting game experiments with only private goods. These low levels of proposer
power are, in turn, reflective of a breakdown in the assumption underlying the SSPE that
only own income matters.
4.3 Discussion
In the case where α = 0.75 the results reported here are similar to results reported in
previous experiments investigating the BF model. With α = 0.75 the theory calls for an
all private goods allocation within a MWC, which is the modal outcome observed. There
is some learning involved as the frequency of MWCs is increasing throughout a session.
The frequency of MWCs is very similar to results from prior experiments on multilateral
bargaining with only particularistic goods. For example, FKM (2005b) report between 61%
and 90% MWCs, depending on the treatment, with committees/legislatures of 3 subjects,
and FKM (2005a) report between 63% and 83% MWCs, depending on the treatment, with
committees/legislatures of 5 subjects. Here too the frequency of MWCs grows, more or
less continuously, throughout a session. Within the MWC, proposers obtain significantly
more private goods than their coalition partners, which is qualitatively what the theory
predicts, but they obtain much less than the SSPE predicts. The level of proposer power
observed with α = 0.75 is close to what has been observed in previous legislative bargaining
experiments with all particularistic goods. Here, proposer’s take in a MWC is about 38% of
the resources, while in FKL and FKM (2005a) proposers take about 40% of the resources
under comparable procedures.30
Two additional results find a parallel in our earlier studies of the BF model. First,
most bargaining rounds end in stage 1. That result has been observed in all of our prior
experiments. Second, the fact that the proposer’s share, which is typically greater than the
shares oﬀered to coalition partners, negatively aﬀects voting has also been observed in one
or more treatments in previous studies of the BF model (FKL, FKMa, b).
The mixed region, where both public and private goods are provided, is relatively narrow
within the theory. It appears that it is even narrower behaviorally, as (i) the modal choice
just coming out of the all public goods region (α = .45) is still all public goods (with
30Both experiments involved legislatures with 5 members with δ = 0.8 in FKL and δ = 1 in FKM(2005a).
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equilibrium type allocations coming in a close second) and (ii) MWCs with all private goods
dominate proposals early on in the neighborhood (α = .65) of the mixed region close to
the all private goods region. With respect to point (ii) however, learning is such that in
later bargaining rounds equilibrium type proposals constitute the modal oﬀer, with these
proposals continuing to grow. In some sense it’s not terribly surprising that the mixed region
is narrower than predicted since in this case equilibrium-type allocations are not quite so
clear cut, unless subjects are doing the sorts of detailed calculations that the theory implies.
Also note that under the constraints of having five players and δ = 0.8 (parameter values
that were selected in order to make the underlying bargaining structure close to our earlier
experiments with all particularistic goods), we selected q (the return on the public good) to
make the mixed region as large as possible.
Our results have implications for the other regarding preference literature in economics.
First, the abundance of MWC proposals with α = 0.75 (also reported in previous ex-
periments with only particularistic goods) indicates that subjects do not have a taste for
maximizing the benefits for the least well oﬀ as some have argued (Charness and Rabin,
2002; Englemann and Strobel, 2004).31 Second, in the region where the model predicts only
private goods, an all public goods allocation would have provided an egalitarian distribution
that was also a more eﬃcient allocation (in the sense of providing more total benefits) than
an MWC with all private goods. Nevertheless, all public good allocations only accounted
for 6% of all proposals overall, even though such proposals were almost certain to be passed.
Rather subjects opted overwhelmingly for MWCs which provided greater benefits to the
members of the coalition than they could have gotten with an all public good allocation.
These results are inconsistent with recent suggestions from the other regarding preferences
literature that subjects have a taste for eﬃciency (see, for example, Charness and Rabin,
2002). The primary diﬀerence between the present experiment and these other experiments
is that the present experiment involves bargaining and these other studies involved sim-
ple dictator games. The clear suggestion from a number of dictator game experiments is
that the results are not robust to small perturbations in the game, no less in the results
31Further, with respect to games with only particularistic goods Montero (2007) shows that the standard
models of other regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) predict that proposer would exhibit
even more proposer power than if subjects didn’t have other regarding preferences, and this is in clear
contradiction with the data in this experiment and previous experiments as well.
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transferring to bargaining environments.32
Our results have connections to VCM type public goods games. Even though there
are radical diﬀerences in the structure between the present game and VCM games, they
do have in common a well defined marginal per capita return (MPCR) for public good
allocations that provides a basis for comparing across games. There are several major,
relevant characteristics to VCM games with moderate numbers of players: (i) public good
contributions typically start rather high and then trial oﬀ over time but rarely are reduced
to zero, (ii) the starting level of public goods contributions is often surprisingly high but
rarely exceeds 50% of the total possible contributions to begin with, and (iii) the level of
public goods contributions is a decreasing function of the MPCR (see Ledyard, 1995 for a
survey of the public goods literature). With respect to the first and second characteristics,
sometimes our data matches it, other times it does not. Take, for example, the α = 0.55
treatment which has an MPCR of 0.57, close to the 0.50 value often employed in VCM games.
Here, the level of public good provision averages slightly over 80% of the maximum possible
contribution and is increasing over time rather than decreasing (86% of the maximum
possible in the last several rounds), consistent with characteristics (i) and (ii) above (see,
for example, Croson, 1996).33 In contrast, with α = 0.75, we have an MPCR of 0.23 which
is close to the 0.30 level others have used (see, for example, Isaac and Walker, 1988). In
this case our results are much closer to those reported for VCM games as public good
contributions are decreasing throughout the session, and start out with public good levels
that are reasonably similar in the two cases (a little over 20% overall in our case versus
a little over 30% in Isaac and Walker with four players). Characteristic (iii), decreasing
public goods levels with the MPCR decreasing, is common to both cases, and provides one
32Battaglini and Palfrey (2011) also reject the possibility that social preferences drive their observed
deviations from equilibrium outcomes. However, a diﬀerence between our model and Battaglini and Palfrey’s
dynamic bargaining model is that risk aversion can produce the more equitable outcomes that they observe,
whereas in the BF model risk aversion generates more unequal outcomes than predicted with risk neutrality
(Harrington, 1990). If all players share the same risk aversion and this is common knowledge, then the
continuation value of the game is lower with risk aversion (as compared to without risk aversion). This is
because of the risk of being excluded from the winning coalition in future rounds of the bargaining process.
Hence the proposer will oﬀer lower shares to coalition members and keep more for himself. This argument
is similar to the argument of Montero for why other regarding preferences lead a proposer to take more for
himself in this game.
33Croson’s (1996) strangers treatment, which is what ours amounts to, has an initial contribution rate of
just over 40%.
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candidate explanation for the reduced public goods contributions in the mixed region, as
subjects react in a “natural” way to the reduced value of the public good. Of course, the
overwhelming diﬀerence between the present game and VCM games, particularly in cases
such as α = 0.55 where the results are very diﬀerent, is that in our case large public good
provision is an equilibrium outcome, whereas in the VCM game its a dominated strategy
(assuming players only care about own income).
5 Conclusions
We investigated a simple model of public goods provision within a legislative bargaining
framework. In the model, legislators/committee members have preferences over public and
private goods that they must decide between given a fixed budget constraint. (Taxes required
to support the budget are exogenous to the model.) Our experimental treatment conditions
focus on varying the weight subjects place on public versus private goods, spanning the
range of predicted outcomes from all public goods, to mixed public and private goods, to
exclusively private goods. We put special emphasis on the mixed region as it provides novel
predictions in that private goods will only be allocated to the proposer, and public good
provision will increase as the value of public goods decrease.
Many of the qualitative predictions of the model find support: Bargaining typically
ends in round 1, there is proposer power in all treatments (albeit, less than predicted),
equilibrium type allocations tend to dominate throughout, and where they do not within
the mixed region, they are growing over time. The one major qualitative failure of the model
is that public good allocations decrease within the mixed region, rather than increase as
the theory predicts. We have argued that this is reflective of much weaker proposer power
than predicted under the SSPE, a result reported in earlier voting game experiments with
all private goods, as well as in the all private goods region reported on here.
References
Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. S.: 1988, Social choice theory, game theory, and positive
political theory, Annual Review of Political Science 1, 259—287.
27
Banks, J. S. and Duggan, J.: 2000, A bargaining model of collective choice, American
Political Science Review 94(1), 73—88.
Baron, D. P. and Diermeier, D.: 2001, Elections, governments, and parliaments under
proportional representation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3), 933—967.
Baron, D. P. and Ferejohn, J. A.: 1989, Bargaining in legislatures, American Political
Science Review 83(4), 1181—1206.
Battaglini, M. and Coate, S.: 2006, A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and
debt. mimeo.
Battaglini, M., Nunnari, S. and Palfrey, T. R.: 2010, Political institutions and the dynamics
of public investment. mimeo.
Battaglini, M. and Palfrey, T. R.: 2011, Dynamics of distributive politics, Economic Theory
. In this issue.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M.: 2002, Understanding social preferences with simple tests, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 17(3), 817—869.
Christiansen, N.: 2010, Greasing the wheels: Pork and public goods contributions in a
legislative bargaining experiment. mimeo.
Crombez, C.: 1996, Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majori-
ties in parliamentary systems, European Journal of Political Research 29(1), 1—29.
Croson, R.: 1996, Partners and strangers revisited, Economics Letters 53, 25—32.
Diermeier, D. and Gailmard, S.: 2006, Self-interest, inequality, and entitlement in majori-
tarian decision-making, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1, 327—350.
Diermeier, D. and Morton, R.: 2004. “Proportionality versus Perfectness: Experiments in
Majoritarian Bargaining” in Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in the Honor
of Jeﬀrey S. Banks, ed. by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan. Berlin: Springer.
Forthcoming.
Drouvelis, M., Montero, M. and Sefton, M.: 2007, The paradox of new members: Strategic
foundations and experimental evidence. CeDEx Discussion Paper.
28
Engelmann, D. and Strobel, M.: 2004, Inequality aversion, eﬃciency and maximin prefer-
ences in simple distribution experiments, American Economic Review 94(4), 857—869.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M.: 1999, A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 817—868.
Fischbacher, U.: 2007, z-tree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments, Exper-
imental Economics 10(2), 171—178.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H. and Lehrer, S. F.: 2003, Bargaining in legislatures: An
experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules, American Political
Science Review 97(2), 221—232.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H. and Morelli, M.: 2005a, Behavioral identification in coalitional
bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating oﬀers,
Econometrica 73(6), 1893—1938.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H. and Morelli, M.: 2005b, Nominal bargaining power, selec-
tion protocol and discounting in legislative bargaining, Journal of Public Economics
89(8), 1497—1517.
Goertz, J. M. M.: 2006, Sequential demands in multi-issue legislative bargaining. mimeo.
Harrington, J. E.: 1990, The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of
a proposal requires less than unanimous approval, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
3, 135—154.
Isaac, M. and Walker, J. M.: 1988, Group size eﬀects in public goods provision: The
voluntary contributions mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(1), 179—
199.
Jackson, M. and Moselle, B.: 2002, Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting
game, Journal of Economic Theory 103, 49—87.
Kagel, J. H., Sung, H. and Winter, E.: 2010, Veto power in committees: an experimental
study, Experimental Economics 13(2), 167—188.
Leblanc, W., Snyder, J. and Tripathi, M.: 2000, Majority-rule bargaining and the under
provision of public investment goods, Journal of Public Economics 75(1), 21—47.
29
Ledyard, J. O.: 1995. “Public Goods” in Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by John
H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 111-194.
Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N.: 2001, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral
incentives, American Economic Review 91(1), 225—239.
McKelvey, R. D.: 1991. “An Experimental Test of a Stochastic Game Model of Committee
Bargaining” in Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy, ed. by Thomas
R. Palfrey. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Montero, M.: 2007, Inequity aversion may increase inequity, Economic Journal
117(519), 192—204.
Morelli, M.: 1999, Demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining,
American Political Science Review 93, 809—820.
Volden, C. and Wiseman, A. E.: 2005, Bargaining in legislatures over particularistic and
collective goods. Paper Presented at the 76th Annual Meetings of the Southern Political
Science Association, January 5-9, New Orleans, Louisiana.
Volden, C. and Wiseman, A. E.: 2006, Bargaining in legislatures over particularistic and
collective goods, American Political Science Review 101(1), 79—92.
30
A Additional Results
Number of Subjects Oﬀered Private Allocations
0 1 2 3 4 5
α = 0.3 0.88 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.04
α = 0.45 0.55 0.30 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.07
α = 0.55 0.34 0.45 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.08
α = 0.65 0.15 0.28 0.00 0.46 0.03 0.08
α = 0.75 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.59 0.04 0.25
Rounds 10 and Above
α = 0.3 0.88 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
α = 0.45 0.53 0.38 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06
α = 0.55 0.24 0.66 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02
α = 0.65 0.14 0.43 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.10
α = 0.75 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.04 0.23
Equilibrium Type Oﬀers are in Bold.
Table 9: Frequency With Which Subjects are Allocated Private Benefits in Accepted Pro-
posals
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All Proposals Equilibrium Type Proposals
All Rounds Rounds > 9 All Rounds Rounds > 9 SSPE
α = 0.3 0.9725 0.9833 1.0000 1.0000 1.000
α = 0.45 0.9290 0.9452 0.8838 0.8812 0.483
α = 0.55 0.8862 0.8925 0.8680 0.8723 0.583
α = 0.65 0.5484 0.7143 0.7976 0.8333 0.680
α = 0.75 0.1788 0.1929 0.0447 0.0587 0.000
Table 10: Average Provision of Public Good for Accepted Proposals
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